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Abstract: Proxy signature schemes have been invented to delegate signing rights. The 
paper proposes a new concept of Identify Based Strong Bi-Designated Verifier threshold 
proxy signature (ID-SBDVTPS) schemes. Such scheme enables an original signer to 
delegate the signature authority to a group of ‘n’ proxy signers with the condition that ‘t’ 
or more proxy signers can cooperatively sign messages on behalf of the original signer 
and the signatures can only be verified by any two designated verifiers and that they 
cannot convince anyone else of this fact.
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1. Introduction
Certificate based cryptography allows a user to use an arbitrary string, unrelated to his identity, as 
his public key. When another user wants to use this public key, she has to obtain an authorized 
certificate that contains this public key. This creates the certificate management problem. To 
address this problem, Shamir [13] introduced the concept of ID based cryptography in 1984. In ID-
based public key cryptography (ID-PKC) user’s public key is derived from certain aspects of his 
identity (email address, phone no. etc.) and a trusted third party called key generating center (KGC) 
generates secret key for the users. Mambo et al [11] introduced the concept of proxy signatures in 
1996. In a proxy signature scheme, an original signer delegates his signing capability to another 
user called proxy signer. Proxy signer signs message on behalf of the original signer, however 
proxy signatures are different from the original signatures. In the same year, Jakobsson et al [2] 
proposed the concept of designated verifier signatures (DVS). In DVS schemes, only the 
designated verifier can check the validity of the signatures but cannot convince any third party 
about the validity of the signatures. Saeednia et al [12] introduced the feature of strongness in DVS 
in 2003. Strong Designated Verifier Signature (SDVS) scheme forces the designated verifier to use 
his secret key at the time of verification. Since then several SDVS [5, 6, 10, 14] schemes have been 
proposed. In 2003, Desmedt [1] raised the problem of generating multi-designated verifier scheme. 
However, the first bi-designated verifier signature scheme using bilinear maps was proposed by 
Laguillaumie et at [9] in 2004. In 2006, the authors [7] proposed the ID-based strong bi-designated 
verifier signature scheme. They also proposed the first ID based strong bi-designated verifier proxy 
signature schemes in which the designated proxy signature can only be verified by the two 
designated verifiers using their secret keys. Zhang [15] and Kim et al [4] independently constructed 
a threshold proxy signature scheme. In a (t, n) threshold proxy signature scheme, the original signer 
delegates parts of his signing power to a group of n proxy signers such that t or more proxy signers 
pooling their shares of delegation can generate proxy signatures but any (t-1) or fewer proxy 
signers cannot create a valid proxy signature. The first ID based threshold proxy signature scheme 
was proposed by Xu et al  [16] in 2004 and the first ID-based designated verifier threshold proxy 
signature scheme was proposed by Juan et al [3] in 2007. In such schemes, the designated verifier 
2can only verify the threshold proxy signatures. The paper presents the extension of Juan et al [3] 
scheme to bi-designated verifier. In our proposed scheme, any of the two designated verifiers can 
check the validity of the threshold proxy signatures but they cannot convince any third party about 
the validity of the signature. Anyone of them can check the validity of the signatures even if he is 
not aware of other’s identity. Our scheme is useful in the situations where the signature verifier 
does not want to rely on a single source for the trueness of the signatures.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows – section 2 contains some preliminaries about 
bilinear pairings and Gap Diffie Hellman group. In section 3 we present our ID-SBDVTPS scheme. 
In section 4 we analyze its security and concluding remarks in section 5.
2.  Definitions
2.1 Bilinear pairings
Let G1 be a cyclic additive group generated by P, whose order is a large prime number q and G2 be 
a cyclic multiplicative group with the same order q. Let e: G1G1G2 be a map with the 
following properties:
Bilinearity: e (aP, bQ) = e(P, Q)ab  P, Q   G1 and a, b   Zq*.
Non-degeneracy:   P, Q   G1, such that e (P, Q)   1, the identity of G2.
Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to compute e (P, Q)  P, Q   G1.                             
Such pairings may be obtained by suitable modification in the Weil-pairing or the Tate-pairing on 
an elliptic curve defined over a finite field.
2.2 Computational problems
Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDHP): Given P, aP, bP, cP in G1, decide whether               
c = ab mod q.
Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP): Given P, aP, bP in G1 compute abP 
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (BDHP): Given P, aP, bP, cP in G1 compute e(P, P)
abc in G2.
Gap Diffie-Hellman Problem (GDHP): A class of problems, where DDHP can be solved in 
polynomial time but no probabilistic algorithm exists that can solve CDHP in polynomial time.
3. Identity Based Strong Bi-Designated Verifier (t, n) Threshold Proxy Signature 
Scheme.
Our scheme is an extension of Juan et al [3] scheme. The single designated verifier is extended to 
bi-designated verifier to form our ID-SBDVTPS scheme. In our scheme, we have assumed Alice as 
the original signer, PS = {P1, P2,…Pn} as the group of ‘n’ proxy signers and Bob and Cindy as the 
two designated verifiers and KGC stands for key generating centre. The scheme is divided into six 
stages: setup, key-generation, secret-share generation, proxy-share generation, proxy-signature 
generation and proxy signature verification.
 Setup: For a given security parameter k, G1 is a GDH group prime order q>2k generated by P 
and e: G1G1G2 is a bilinear map. KGC chooses a master key s  Zq* and sets Ppub = sP.
Chooses two cryptographic hash functions H1: {0,1}
*  Zq*, H2: {0,1}*G1  Zq* and          
H3 :{0,1}
*G1G2  Zq*. The system parameters (q, G1, G2, e, P, Ppub,, H1, H2, H3) are made 
public and ‘s’ is kept secret with KGC.
 Key generation: Given a users identity ID, KGC computes his public key QID = H1(ID) and 
the associated secret key SID = s
-1QID.P.
3 Secret share generation: The proxy group applies a (t, n) verifiable secret sharing scheme to 
generate secret shares for all the proxy signers in PS as follows: 
 Each Pi PS = {P1, P2,…Pn} randomly chooses a (t - 1) degree polynomial 
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 Proxy share generation:  Each proxy signer PiPS gets his own proxy signing key share as 
follows:
 The original signer Alice first randomly chooses rw   Zq* and computes 
Uw = rw QIDA.P, hw = H2 (mw, Uw), Vw = (rw + hw) SIDA
The signature on mw is w = (Uw, Vw). Finally, Alice sends w and mw to each PiPS
 To verify a signature, the proxy signer Pi computes hw = H2 (mw, Uw) and accepts the 
signature iff e(Ppub, Vw) = e(P, Uw + hw QIDAP) and rejects it otherwise. If the signature w is 
accepted, Pi computes Si = SIDi + Vw as his own proxy secret.
 Pi randomly chooses a (t - 1) degree polynomial i
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coefficients bil G1 and publishes Bil = e(P, bil) for l = 1, 2, …t-1. Bio can be computed by 
each proxy signer as Bio = e(P, Uw + (QIDPi + hw QIDA)P). Furthermore, Pi sends gi(j) to Pj
via a secure channel for i ≠ j.
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 Proxy signature generation:  Let D = {P1, P2,…Pt} be the group of ‘t’ proxy signers who 
want to sign message ‘m’ on behalf of the original signer Alice.
 Apply the Lagrange interpolation formula to compute 
X = QIDB QIDC, GV i = e(XP, SID i),
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Let H = H3 (m, U, Y). Each PiD computes Vi = Ui + H SKPi and σi = (Ui, Vi) be his own 
proxy signature share.
 On receiving σi, the designated clerk validates it by checking e(P, Vi) = e(P, Ui) e(P, SKPi)H
If it holds, then σi is the valid individual proxy signature share on ‘m’. If all the individual 
4proxy signature shares for ‘m’ are valid, then the clerk computes 
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signature on ‘m’ is σ = (m, Vw, mw, U, V)
 Proxy signature verification: To verify the proxy signature σ, the designated verifiers Bob 
(and Cindy) compute QIDC = QIDB
-1 X, (Bob) Y* = e(SIDBQIDC, U(∑QIDPi)) and accepts the 
signature iff  e(Ppub, V) = e(Ppub, U + nHVw) e(P, (∑QIDPi)P)H.
4. Security analysis: 
In this section we analyze the security of the proposed ID-SBDVPS schemes.
4.1 Correctness: The following equation gives the correctness of the scheme for Bob
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4.2 Strongness: In the proposed scheme proxy signatures are generated in such a manner that only 
the two designated verifier Bob and Cindy can check the validity of the signatures using his 
secret key. Hence, our scheme provides the strongness property.
4.3 Proxy protected: Alice cannot generate a valid signature share on behalf of Pi, since he does 
not have any information about the secret key SIDPi of each Pi. Hence, our scheme is proxy 
protected.
4.4 Secrecy: In our proposed scheme, the original signer Alice secret key cannot be derived from 
any information such as the shares of the proxy signing key, proxy signature etc. Even if ‘t’ out 
of ‘n’ proxy signers collaborates to deliver the proxy share, they cannot calculate the Alice 
secret key. Hence, our scheme is secure.
55. Conclusion: 
In this paper, we have presented a new concept of Identity based strong bi-designated verifier (t, n) 
threshold proxy signature scheme. The proposed scheme can also be viewed as a double threshold 
signature scheme as it uses threshold in signature generation and signature verification phase. The 
scheme is applicable in the situations where receiver wants the signatures to be verified by two 
designated persons and no one other than these two designated persons can check the trueness of 
the signatures.
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